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COMMENTS
Apportionment Between Partmakers and
Assemblers in Strict Liability
A makes steering mechanisms for sale to automobile manufac-
turers, including B, which in turn assemble and sell automobiles to
the public. B sells a car to C, who is subsequently injured when the
car veers off a highway. C sues for compensatory damages on a
theory of strict products liability,1 alleging that defects in the
steering mechanism proximately caused the accident. He prevails
at trial and is awarded $100,000. In most jurisdictions either A, B,
or both can be held liable for C's injuries.2
Courts traditionally have used theories of indemnification,
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)] provides:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
Thirty-seven jurisdictions follow section 402A(1). 1 PROD. LijAB. REP. (CCH) 4016 (July
1980).
2 On assembler liability, see, e.g., LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d
985 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Louisiana law); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,
391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air
Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973); Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191
N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). On component manufacturer liability, see, e.g., E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying Texas law);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Clark v. Bendix Corp., 42
A.D.2d 727, 345 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1973); Burbage v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319,
249 A.2d 563 (1969).
3 Where C sues only A, the indemnification rule would allow A to recover fully from B,
but only if A is the less culpable of the two. Compare Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378
F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967); Feinstein v. Edward Livingston & Sons, 457 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1970);
and Burbage v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969) (indemnity
allowed) with Topel v. Porter, 95 Ill. App. 2d 315, 237 N.E.2d 711 (1968); Reid v. Royal Ins.
Co., 80 Nev. 137, 390 P.2d 45 (1964); and United Tractor, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 563 S.W.2d
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pro-rata contribution, 4 and no contribution 5 to govern apportion-
ment among joint tortfeasors.6 Courts have begun to employ prin-
ciples of comparative negligence7 in allocating liability between
plaintiffs and defendants in strict liability actions,8 however, and
850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (indemnity denied). The ambiguities of this approach have been
criticized. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147-50, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-93, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 386-89 (1972). See generally Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint
Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav. 728, 737-41 (1968).
' Pro-rata contribution would divide liability evenly between A and B regardless of
their relative culpability and regardless of C's choice of defendant. See Rock v. Reed-Pren-
tice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 38-39, 346 N.E.2d 520, 522, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720,
721-22 (1976); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1, 2, 12 U.L.A. 63, 87
(1955); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130
(1932); Comment, Another Look at Strict Liability: The Effect on Contribution Among
Tortfeasors, 79 DICK. L. REv. 125, 126-34 (1974); Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint
Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 964 (1959).
5 Under the no-contribution rule, C's choice of defendant would be undisturbed, for the
liable tortfeasor would be prevented from recovering any portion of the judgment against
him from the other. See, e.g., Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657
(1968); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928). See also Com-
ment, Relative Contribution Among Tortfeasors: Time for Judicial Change of the Wash-
ington Rule?, 11 GONZ. L. REv. 179 (1975); Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors, 31 MoNT. L. REV. 69 (1969).
6 The apportionment issue can arise either where the plaintiff joins both tortfeasors,
see LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); Favors v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 309 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 M11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), or where the plaintiff sues only one tortfeasor,
who subsequently seeks indemnification or contribution from the other, see Thomas v. Kai-
ser Agricultural Chems., 81 Ml1. 2d 206, 407 N.E.2d 32 (1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wil-
liams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 IlM. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
7 There are two forms of comparative negligence: "pure," where the plaintiff's recovery
is reduced by the percentage of his negligence, and "modified," where the plaintiff is barred
from recovery if his own negligence equals or exceeds 50%. See V. ScHwARTZ, ComPARATri
NEGLIGENCE 268-71 (1974). When applied to apportionment of damages among joint
tortfeasors, "pure" comparative negligence principles lead to each tortfeasor paying accord-
ing to his percentage of fault. See, e.g., Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971); Bielski
v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). For example, in a case where damages of
$100,000 are awarded, and A is 40% culpable and B is 60% culpable, A pays C $40,000 and
B pays C $60,000. Modified comparative negligence produces the same results as pure com-
parative negligence except for the case in which C's culpability exceeds the total of A's and
B's culpability. Thus, if C is 60% culpable and A and B are each 20% culpable, C recovers
nothing. Under pure comparative negligence C recovers $20,000 from A and $20,000 from B.
See Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 891-95, 356 S.W.2d 20, 25-27 (1962).
8 See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734-35, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 385 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1970); Busch v.
Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393-94 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351
(1979).
Some courts and commentators have opposed the infusion of comparative negligence
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we may now expect them to use these principles in apportioning
strict liability among tortfeasors9 This approach, referred to in
this comment as comparative apportionment,10 would divide liabil-
principles into strict liability actions. See Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1976); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974); General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862-63 (Tex. 1977); Levine, Strict Products Lia-
bility and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 337 (1977); Comment, Comparative Fault and Products Liability: Are They Compati-
ble?, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 501 (1978). These arguments have been characterized as appeals
not to "mix oil and water," see Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence
Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts 2d (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNS. J. 39 (1975), or to "compare apples and
oranges," see Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 331, 579 P.2d 441, 445, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 554 (1978); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. Rav. 373, 376 (1978). See also Comment, supra, at
515. Compare the approach taken in Wisconsin, where the supreme court noted that strict
liability is equivalent to negligence per se, thereby enabling the state's comparative negli-
gence statute to be applied to strict liability actions. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461-
62, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967) (dictum).
See, e.g., City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207
N.W.2d 866 (1973). See also MODEL UNIFORM PRODucrs LIABILITY ACT § 111 (U.S. Dept. of
Commerce 1979) (requiring apportionment according to percentage of fault) [hereinafter
cited as MUPLA], reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,734-35 (1979); UNIFORM COMPARA-
TIVE FAULT ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 40, 41 (Supp. 1981) (providing for "pure" contribution among
tortfeasors). Cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 550 (1978) (comparative apportionment between a strictly liable defendant and a neg-
ligent defendant).
10 Some courts and writers have tried to finesse the perceived conflict between compar-
ative negligence principles and strict liability by labeling the doctrine "comparative fault."
See Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976)
(Clark, J., dissenting); Kroll, Comparative Fault: A New Generation in Products Liability,
1977 INS. L.J. 492; Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking
Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Rethinking].
Some maintain that comparative fault cannot be applied to strict liability because strict
liability is a no-fault doctrine. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 8; Comment, supra note 8. There
is much support, however, for the view that strict liability actually does involve fault. See,
e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 889 (Alaska 1979) ("The production and
marketing of a defective product is tantamount to 'fault' in the sense that we will impose
legal responsibility for it."); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843
(1978); Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10
IND. L. REv. 797, 819-30 (1977); Wade, supra note 8, at 376-77 (1978). See also Christopher-
son v. Hyster Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 791, 374 N.E.2d 858 (1978).
Others have labeled the concept "comparative causation." See Pan-Alaska Fisheries,
Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139 (9th Cir. 1977); Sun Valley Air-
lines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho 1976); Twerski, The
Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation,
29 MERCER L. REV. 403 (1978); Comment, Comparative Causation, Indemnity, and the Al-
location of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 587 (1979) [hereinafter cited as St. Mary's Comment]; Comment, Comparative Causa-
tion: A Legislative Proposal for the Equitable Allocation of Loss Between Strictly Liable
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ity between component manufacturers and final-product assem-
blers according to their relative percentages of culpability. Thus, if
A were held to be 40% culpable and B to be 60% culpable, A
would pay C $40,000 and B would pay C $60,000.
This comment argues that the comparative apportionment ap-
proach is doubly flawed. Because the question of apportionment is
typically left to the jury,11 divisions of liability tend to be arbitrary
and standardless. 12 Moreover, even if principled guidelines for de-
termining percentages of culpability could be enforced, apportion-
ment frequently undermines the policies behind strict liability and
fails to provide the correct behavioral incentives to component
manufacturers and final-product assemblers. The comment argues
instead that the "cheapest cost avoider" should bear full liability.
Under this approach, the factfinder should simply ask who can
more easily detect and correct the defect. The comment then ar-
gues that where detection and correction efficiencies are divided
between component manufacturers and product assemblers, a
"duty-to-warn" analysis should be employed. Under this approach,
the party with the lowest detection costs would bear full liability,
but could shift this liability to the party with the lowest correction
costs if it provided a full warning of the detected dangers. Finally,
the comment examines the case law and demonstrates that many
courts, although employing disparate analyses, have implicitly em-
braced the cheapest cost avoider analysis.
I. ANALYSIS OF STRICT LIABILITY POLICIES
This part discusses the relative merits of the comparative ap-
portionment and cheapest cost avoider approaches.1 3 The inquiry
and Negligent Parties, 20 S. TEx. L.J. 123 (1979). For an economic analysis of apportion-
ment based on an assessment of causation, see Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in
the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980).
When applied solely to allocation of damages among defendants, several commentators
call the concept "comparative contribution." See Berg, Comparative Contribution and Its
Alternatives: The Equitable Distribution of Accident Losses, 43 INS. COUNS. J. 577 (1976);
Davis, Comparative Negligence, Comparative Contribution and Equal Protection in the
Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant Product Cases, 10 IND. L. REV. 831 (1977).
" See, e.g., City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 652-55,
207 N.W.2d 866, 871-73 (1973); see also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 46-52, 73-82.
12 See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 335, 579 P.2d 441, 448, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring); see also Jensvold, A Modern Approach to
Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 724-
25 (1974); St. Mary's Comment, supra note 10, at 607-09.
11 The analysis developed in this comment is concerned primarily with the long-run
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is organized by analyses of the four basic policies that underlie
strict liability: deterring the entry of defective products into the
marketplace, distributing the risk of loss as widely as possible,
compensating injured consumers, and imposing the social costs of
an enterprise on those who benefit directly from it.
A. Deterrence
Although deterring the entry of defective products into the
marketplace is a fundamental goal of strict liability,14 courts and
legislatures do not seek to prevent all possible defect-related acci-
dents. Rather, tort law may be viewed as having the objective of
optimal deterrence-that is, of deterring only those accidents
whose costs to society15 exceed their prevention costs.,,
effects of alternative liability approaches; several assumptions follow from this emphasis.
Returning to the example in the introduction, it must be assumed that the defective steer-
ing system is not unique to C's car, but is a design defect that can be predicted to cause
injury to other consumers. A and B therefore will be able to project accurately total accident
costs due to the defective steering system. Second, A and B are assumed to know their own
costs of prevention. Finally, the analysis presupposes that the market price of A's and B's
products will adjust to reflect fully their accident and prevention costs.
This comment also sidesteps much of the debate over the definition of "defect" in the
strict liability context. Although there is no standard definition, a common inquiry considers
the appropriateness of a product's condition in light of its foreseeable uses. See Dickerson,
Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Fischer,
Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Montgomery & Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Prod-
ucts, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 808-24 (1976); Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defective-
ness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 101 (1977); Twerski, Rethinking, supra note
10, at 298-335; Vargo, Products Liability in Indiana-In Search of a Standard for Strict
Liability in Tort, 10 IND. L. REV. 871, 871-88 (1977); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 828-38 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Products];
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-17 (1965). Cf. Calabresi &
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE. L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (fo-
cusing on the parties' relative abilities to prevent the accident); Shapo, A Representational
Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disap-
pointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974) (emphasizing product portrayal as a basis of
liability).
" See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring); MUPLA, supra note 9, § 103(C)(3), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,720. But
see Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 1329, 1333 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
lB "Accident costs," as used in this comment, include only such costs as could be com-
pensated in a liability judgment against a manufacturer. Defective products may cause other
costs to society that would not be so compensated. See G. CALAREsi, THE COSTS OF Acci-
DENTS 198-243 (1970). Elimination of these "externalities" would require a collective deci-
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1. Cheapest Cost Avoider Analysis. Professor Ronald Coase
has demonstrated that, in the absence of transaction costs, market
forces will ensure that optimal deterrence is achieved regardless of
the initial legal allocation of accident costs. 17 The Coase theorem
implies that the burden of preventing a class of accidents eventu-
ally will be borne by the party who is able to prevent the accidents
at least cost18 - the cheapest cost avoider. 19 Whenever acci-
dent costs exceed the cheapest cost avoider's prevention costs,
those who bear the accident costs will bargain with the cheapest
sion to regulate, restrict, or ban the sale of products tending to create these costs. Such
collective decisions, however, are outside the scope of a privately enforced system of tort law
and thus outside the scope of this comment. See generally id. at 68-69; Calabresi, Does the
Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 429,
433 (1968).
Most jurisdictions do not allow recovery for purely economic or commercial loss, such as
lost profits. See 1 PROD. LIAB. Rap. 4230 (CCH) (May 1981) (compiling cases). This reti-
cence leaves real economic costs uncompensated, thus undermining one of strict liability's
goals, optimal deterrence. An appropriate solution would be to allow recovery for all com-
pensable damages; the doctrine could then be freed to work its intended result. A similar
argument can be made for compensating emotional injury to the extent that it may be con-
sidered a social cost.
14 See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 713, 716-21 (1965). See also Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (1972). Optimal deterrence has been described as the minimization of
the sum of accident costs and accident prevention costs. See Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence
and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 656 (1975); Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A
Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 294 (1976).
This discussion does not deny that considerations besides optimal resource alloca-
tion-such as justice, fairness, or morality-will be part of society's decision to deter acci-
dents. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972);
McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 3 (1970). Cf.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 152 (1973) (criticizing economic
analysts for failing to address questions of fairness). To the extent that these considerations
are implicit in liability judgments, the definition of accident costs adopted will account for
them. Indeed, the policies of compensation, enterprise liability, and risk spreading so clearly
reflect these concerns that the doctrine of strict liability already represents most jurisdic-
tions' chosen method for achieving justice, fairness, and morality in products liability cases.
Of course, some courts may feel that the doctrine does not always go far enough in this
direction; morality, fairness, and justice may account for those cases in which punitive dam-
ages are awarded against a strictly liable defendant. See, e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
297 N.W.2d 727, 732-33 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Wussow v. Commercial
Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 155-56, 293 N.W.2d 897, 907 (1980) ("While punitive
damages have as one purpose the deterrence of similar future outrageous conduct, they also,
as the very name suggests, are intended to punish . . . past willful, wanton, or reckless
conduct."). See generally Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manu-
facturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1982); Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1976).
17 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
1s Id. at 15.
19 See G. CALABREsI, supra note 15, at 135.
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cost avoider to prevent the accident. The initial allocation of liabil-
ity for defect-related accidents thus has no effect on the eventual
allocation, because the parties will bargain until the cheapest cost
avoider contracts to bear the liability.20
Sole reliance on the marketplace to achieve optimal deter-
rence, however, carries significant costs that often will justify judi-
cial intervention and allocation of accident costs. Against the ad-
ministrative costs of judicial intervention21 must be weighed at
least two factors. First, private attempts to find the cheapest cost
avoider usually involve transaction costs, 2  and in many situations
the costs of judicial intervention may be less than the sum of these
private costs. 23 Second, a cheapest cost avoider can be expected to
charge a premium as part of its bargain to bear prevention costs.
Depending on the parties' relative bargaining positions, this pre-
mium can range anywhere from just above zero to just below the
difference between their prevention costs, resulting in a transfer of
wealth. One could argue that cheapest cost avoiders should not
profit by their ultimate responsibility,24 and that such transfers are
unjust, even immoral.
When intervention is warranted, standards must be formu-
20 See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Com-
ment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67 (1968); Chelius, supra note 16, at 294-95; Demsetz, When Does
the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14 (1972); Demsetz, The Exchange and
Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1964).
22 Administrative costs include the judicial costs of identifying the cheapest cost
avoider and imposing liability on it. See generally Calabresi, supra note 15, at 439.
22 The total prevention costs therefore equal the lowest available prevention costs plus
the sum of all transaction costs incurred. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 15, at 136-38; Cala-
bresi, supra note 15, at 437-38.
When transaction costs reach a prohibitive level, the Coase theorem no longer governs
the transaction; the total accident prevention costs then equal the costs to the party who
initially bears the liability. See G. CALABREsi, supra note 15, at 136-38; Calabresi, supra note
15, at 437-38. If the barriers to negotiation between partmakers and assemblers were this
high, however, it seems that they would prevent most assemblers from even dealing with
partmakers. The very existence of a final product assembled in multiple stages suggests that
transaction costs are not prohibitive.
2 In such cases, judicial intervention becomes desirable. See Calabresi, supra note 15,
at 439. One might argue that some partmakers and assemblers maintain such a close con-
tractual relationship that they could costlessly shift the liability burden to the cheaper cost
avoider. The California Supreme Court used.this reasoning to support its assertion that
"[s]trict liability on the manufacturer and retailer. . . works no injustice to the defendants
. . . ." Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 900 (1964). If this were the case, optimal deterrence would be achieved by a rule
of no indemnity, no contribution, and no apportionment among such manufacturers.
24 See generally Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 223 (1972).
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lated for judicial allocation of accident costs. Both the maximiza-
tion of deterrence and the minimization of its costs suggest that
courts should replicate the private search for the cheapest cost
avoider.25
a. Maximizing deterrence. A system that apportions liability
based on relative degrees of culpability can discourage deterrence.
For example, if patmaker A has $20 in prevention costs and as-
sembler B has $5 in prevention costs, B is the cheaper cost avoider.
If a jury found A to be 75 % culpable for an accident and B 25 %
culpable, and awarded C $10 in damages, A would pay $7.50 and B
would pay $2.50. As a result of this apportionment, however,
neither A nor B would have an incentive to prevent future defects,
for it would cost A $20 to save $7.50 in future liability and B $5 to
save $2.50. Optimal deterrence is best promoted if the entire judg-
ment is imposed on B, the cheaper cost avoider, because B will
then have an incentive to spend $5 to save $10 in future liability.
b. Minimizing costs. Even where the prevention costs of both
the partmaker and the assembler are less than C's accident costs,
thus guaranteeing deterrence however liability is allocated, the
cheapest cost avoider should bear the full liability to achieve opti-
mal deterrence. Thus, if A has prevention costs of $20 and B of $5,
the cheapest and most efficient deterrence scheme will always
make B fully liable, for his prevention costs are $15 less than A's.
2. Alternative and Joint Care. There are two components of
cheapest cost avoider analysis. First, to prevent an accident, a
party must become aware of and appreciate the risk of accident
and the hazards it poses.26 The party must then be in a position to
25 Professors Calabresi and Hirschoff have suggested a test for strict liability that would
impose liability on the party best able to analyze the costs and benefits of accident preven-
tion and then "bribe" the cheapest cost avoider to bear liability. See Calabresi & Hirschoff,
supra note 13, at 1060-66. This suggestion implicitly assumes that the administrative costs
of finding the cheapest analyzer-briber are lower than the transaction costs incurred by pri-
vate attempts to do so, and that transaction costs incurred when the cheapest analyzer-
briber bribes the cheapest cost avoider are lower than the administrative costs of additional
judicial intervention. It seems, however, that whether an individual is best able to bribe the
cheapest cost avoider necessarily depends on who the cheapest cost avoider is. Thus, in
finding the cheapest briber, the court will also have found the cheapest cost avoider, and
additional administrative costs will be close to zero. Thus if the first assumption were valid,
complete intervention would be a more efficient solution than partial intervention. See also
Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 214-15 (1973).
26 Note, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1051, 1057-58 (1971); cf. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PROD-
ucTs LIABILITY § 16A(5)(f), at 3B-218 (1977) (discussing requirements for defense of assump-
tion of risk).
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control proximate events to prevent the risk from materializing.27
Once a consumer-plaintiff has demonstrated both the sale of a de-
fective product and proximate cause,28 a court must determine
which manufacturer faced the lowest costs of detection and con-
trol; that party will be the cheapest cost avoider.
The relative costs of two manufacturers may not always lend
themselves to a straightforward cheapest cost avoider analysis.
Naturally, where least-cost prevention can be achieved only if one
manufacturer acts alone to prevent the defect, optimal deterrence
requires imposing full liability on that manufacturer. This situa-
tion can be described as the "alternative-care case. '2' There may
be situations, however, in which least-cost prevention can be
achieved only if both manufacturers take preventive measures. If,
Cf. McKean, supra note 16, at 32 (illustrating the steps auto drivers and producers
would have to take to prevent injuries from auto accidents).
28 There may be occasions when the consumer could have prevented the accident at a
lower cost than either manufacturer. As an instrument of optimal deterrence, therefore,
strict liability should be imposed only where the manufacturers had lower costs of preven-
tion. This factor seems to be implicit in the "defective condition" and "proximate cause"
requirements. Courts frequently note that manufacturers are not "absolute insurers," and a
general public awareness of a product's danger or a consumer's superior knowledge of the
product's intended use support findings of "no defect." See, e.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams
All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1975) ("If the
average consumer would reasonably anticipate the dangerous condition of the product and
fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it would not be unreasonably dangerous and
defective."). Similarly, consumer misuse of a product often is held to constitute an interven-
ing factor that negates proximate causation. See, e.g., Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335
So. 2d 134, 143 (Ala. 1976); Illinois State Trust Co. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 73 Ill. App. 3d 585,
589-90, 392 N.E.2d 70, 73 (1979).
Even where a defect and proximate causation have been established, demonstration of a
consumer's superior ability to prevent the accident can still bar recovery under the "as-
sumption of risk" or "misuse" doctrines. Assumption of risk generally is pleaded as an af-
firmative defense and bars compensation to a plaintiff who "voluntarily and unreasonably
proceed[ed] to encounter a known danger." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 402A
comment n; see Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiffs Conduct, 1968
UTAH L. Rav. 267, 270. "Misuse," on the other hand, generally refers to the use of a product
for a purpose neither intended by nor foreseeable to the manufacturer. RESTATEmENT (SEc-
oND), supra, note 1, § 402A comment h; Epstein, supra, at 270. These doctrines rest on the
premise that a consumer usually will face lower control costs than any manufacturer be-
cause he physically manipulates or places himself in proximity to the product. Accordingly,
assumption of risk focuses on the consumer's ability to detect the danger and bars recovery
when it appears that the consumer had detection costs that were lower than or comparable
to the manufacturer's. Misuse, on the other hand, focuses on the manufacturer's ability to
detect the danger and bars recovery when it appears that it could not have had lower detec-
tion costs than the consumer. Arguably, therefore, these doctrines enable courts and juries
to conduct intuitive cheapest cost avoider inquiries.
29 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 526 (1980).
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for example, partmaker A faces the lowest detection costs while
assembler B faces the lowest control costs, least-cost prevention re-
quires that A detect the defective condition and that B correct it.
For A's detection to be of any use to B, A must inform B of the
defect. The total costs of joint prevention will be the sum of A's
detection costs, A's warning costs, and B's control costs. When the
sum of A's detection and warning costs are lower than B's detec-
tion costs, joint prevention will cost less than any other prevention
method. This situation, which can be described as the "joint-care
case, "30 requires that specially tailored incentives be imposed on
each manufacturer.
a. Duty to warn. Because detection of the defective or poten-
tially defective condition must precede its correction, the most
straightforward approach would be to impose full liability on the
party with the lowest detection costs, but allow that liability to be
shifted to the party with the lowest control costs upon a showing
that the former effectively informed the latter of the condition. In
the situation described above, A would have a duty to warn B of
the defective condition, enforced by the threat of full liability; as
long as the expected liability costss exceeded the sum of A's detec-
tion and warning costs, A would have an incentive to detect the
condition. After A detected and warned B of the condition, how-
ever, its duty would be discharged, and B would then bear full lia-
bility. As long as expected liability costs exceeded B's control costs,
B would have an incentive to correct the condition.3 2
'o Id. at 522.
Expected liability costs are the amount of damages the manufacturer of a defective
product would have to pay for resulting injuries, discounted by the probability that liability
will be incurred. To achieve optimal deterrence, tort rules should be consistent so as to
cause this probability to approach 100% in situations where the manufacturer should be
liable, necessarily militating against the use of comparative liability as apportioned at the
whim of a jury.
s Compare the approach taken in Illinois, where the claimant-assembler and defen-
dant-partmaker in an indemnity action are simply placed in the positions of an ordinary
plaintiff and defendant. For the claimant to recover in strict liability, he must establish a
plaintiff's prima facie case: that the product was defective when the defendant sold it, that
the defect proximately caused the injury for which the claimant had been or might be held
liable, and that the defect was "unreasonably dangerous." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams
Mach. & Tool Co., 62 M1l. 2d 77, 85, 338 N.E.2d 857, 861 (1975). The partmaker is entitled to
the same defenses as an ordinary defendant, including the defense that the assembler as-
sumed the risk that the injury would occur. Id. at 83, 338 N.E.2d at 860; McCaffrey v.
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 71 Ill. App. 3d 42, 49, 388 N.E.2d 1062, 1068 (1979). Assumption of
risk, however, is not a complete defense to an action for contribution, because Illinois has
adopted comparative contribution among defendants to avoid the "injustice" of a complete
bar to third-party recovery. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 70 IMI. 2d
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Imposing liability for failure to warn of a defect or danger is a
well-entrenched doctrine in strict liability; "defect" usually is de-
fined in these cases as the absence or inadequacy of a warning.33
The duty-to-warn system would define A's failure to warn B as a
defect for which A would bear full liability.3 Discharging the duty
to warn would prevent the product from being "defective" as it left
A's hands and thus would absolve A of liability. Some cases, how-
ever, have implied that a defect exists regardless of the presence of
an adequate warning.3 5 Under this view, A's warning would consti-
tute an exculpatory act, relieving A of liability for producing a de-
fective product.3 6 Either way, a court would have little trouble ap-
plying this analysis once the costs of detection, warning, and
control had been established.
In joint-care cases, the system proposed here will achieve opti-
mal deterrence in all but one instance: where the costs of joint pre-
vention are greater, and the minimum sum of detection and warn-
1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). If traditional concepts of defect,
proximate cause, misuse, and assumption of risk effectively cause accident cost burdens to
fall on the cheapest cost avoider, see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text, the Illinois
approach to indemnity (absent its comparative contribution component) could prove highly
useful in allocating liability among manufacturers. In the joint-care case, an assembler who
had been warned effectively by the partmaker could be said to have assumed the risk and
thus to be barred from recovery. Of course, this approach would be of little help when the
partmaker sued the assembler for indemnity.
3 See, e.g., Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 173, 583 P.2d 276, 283 (1978);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 100, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975); Teagle v.
Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 155, 570 P.2d 438, 442 (1977).
It is important to note that under the duty-to-warn scheme developed here, the
warning owed by A to manufacturer B may be completely different from the warning owed
to consumer C. For example, if a component is innocuous by itself, but becomes dangerous
when incorporated into a final assembly in a particular way, partmaker A could have a duty
to warn assembler B not to so incorporate the part. See Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural
Chems., 81 11. 2d 206, 217, 407 N.E.2d 32, 37-38 (1980). Such a warning would be useless to
a consumer because he would have no way of knowing, or perhaps even understanding,
whether the part had been incorporated properly. The assembler who improperly incorpo-
rates the part, however, might incur a separate obligation to warn of the danger to the
consumer thereby created. When "defect" is defined to encompass an inadequate warning,
therefore, the defect in the product when the partmaker ships it need not necessarily be the
same as the defect in the product when the assembler ships it. See Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964); Sharp v.
Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90
Wis. 2d 672, 685-86, 280 N.W.2d 226, 232-33 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, §
402A comments p & q.
"1 See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
391 (1981).
36 This could be done either by manipulating tke definition of proximate cause or by
holding that B assumed the risk. See supra note 28.
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ing costs are less, than the expected liability costs.3 7 If A is the
cheaper detector and warner at $23, B the cheaper controller at
$25, and the expected liability is $35, A and B each will fulfill their
duties to avoid liability, but the total costs of joint care will exceed
by $13 the expected liability. Moreover, control costs need not be
less than expected liability for misallocation to occur. For example,
if A and B faced the same costs as above, but expected liability
was $24, A would spend $23 to detect and warn while B would pay
$24 for the accident rather than the $25 necessary to prevent it.
The result: a total social loss of $47.
b. Comparative costs. To avoid these misallocations, a com-
parative cost system could be employed. This approach would seek
to determine each party's costs of detection, warning, and control;
to calculate the minimum joint cost of prevention; and to impose
liability on each party in an amount equal to the full liability judg-
ment, multiplied by the ratio of each party's minimum cost to the
minimum joint prevention costs. Whenever total liability exceeded
joint prevention costs, A's share of liability would exceed the sum
of its detection and warning costs, and B's share of liability would
exceed its control costs. Each party therefore would have an incen-
tive to perform its role in preventing the defect. On the other
hand, whenever total liability was less than the costs of joint pre-
vention, A's share of liability would be less than the sum of its
detection and warning costs, B's share would be less than its con-
trol costs, and neither party would try to prevent the accident.3 8
Despite its theoretical appeal, the comparative cost system has
some serious practical drawbacks. First, the liability anticipated by
one manufacturer necessarily depends on the precise costs faced by
the other. Although it can be assumed that each party knows its
own prevention costs, it may be unreasonable to assume that each
knows the other's well, if at all.39 The duty-to-warn model requires
37 This case does not conffict with the argument that the no-contribution rule is always
efficient in joint-care cases under a negligence system. See Landes & Posner, supra note 29,
at 522-26. Landes and Posner posited a negligence system where liability is imposed only
where expected accident costs exceed prevention costs. Id. at 521. Under the strict liability
system discussed here, liability is imposed even where expected accident costs fall below
prevention costs.
38 Cf. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE
L.J. 697, 705-06 n.44 (1978) (discussing similar methods of comparing the negligence of a
plaintiff and a defendant in a negligence system).
3' This could occur only if transaction costs involved in sharing cost information were
relatively low. If this were the case, the Coase theorem would govern the transaction, and
judicial intervention might be unnecessary. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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firms to evaluate their relative costs, but it only calls for a crude
approximation, not a precise dollar figure. Furthermore, condition-
ing one party's liability on the conduct of the other would create
opportunities for extortion whenever the parties were in unequal
bargaining positions or faced different levels of expected liability.40
The misallocations caused by these problems could exceed the mis-
allocations of the duty-to-warn model.
Even if the comparative cost system created none of these
misallocations, it would probably entail significantly higher admin-
istrative costs than the duty-to-warn model, for it requires the
court to determine precise cost proportions, while the duty-to-warn
model asks only who can more easily detect or correct the defect.
The latter is a far more simple inquiry, one that juries are well-
equipped to make. Moreover, to the extent that the courts' costs
evaluations were inaccurate, their liability judgments would send
flawed accident cost signals to manufacturers, thus resulting in
suboptimal accident prevention. Assuming that both approaches
are preferable to reliance on private market transactions, the
choice depends on the relative danger of misallocations and the
relative level of administrative costs. The duty-to-warn model ap-
pears to offer a clearer and less cumbersome method of
apportionment.4
1
B. Risk Spreading
To minimize individual economic dislocations,4 manufactur-
ers are held strictly liable on the theory that they can more easily
insure against and distribute accident costs than individual vic-
tims. 43 If a manufacturer bears liability for accidents caused by its
40 See Demsetz, supra note 24, at 230-32.
41 The problem is reminiscent of the debate over the relative "efficiency" of negligence
and strict liability. As Judge Posner has pointed out in that context, the issue "seems at this
stage hopelessly conjectural; the question is at bottom empirical, and the empirical work has
not been done." Posner, supra note 25, at 211-12.
42 See Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of
Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. Rav. 805, 809 (1930).
43 See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979); Price v. Shell
Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-82 (1970) (en banc);
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J.,
549, 550 (1948); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24
TENN. L. REV. 963, 1010 (1957); Sachs, Negligence or Strict Product Liability: Is There
Really a Difference in Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J. INT'L & Con'. L. 259, 262 (1978); Wade,
Products, supra note 13, at 826. Whether this is true will depend on the realities of insur-
ance availability and practice. When consumers carry insurance and are able to assess the
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defective products, it will insure against this risk either through
self-insurance or by obtaining outside insurance.""
Imposing full liability on the "cheapest insurer" will achieve
optimal risk spreading. Given consistent liability rules, an insur-
ance company will charge no more in the long run to insure one
manufacturer than another, as long as defective products cause
consistent accident costs and all manufacturers face equal preven-
tion costs.4 5 But when one manufacturer has lower prevention
costs, the threat of liability will induce it to prevent more of the
accidents, its actuarial risk of liability will be lower, and it will be
able to obtain insurance at a lower cost. In other words, the search
for the cheapest insurer simply recreates the search for the cheap-
est cost avoider. The conclusions drawn under optimal deterrence
therefore apply as well to risk spreading, and both policies call for
imposing liability on the same manufacturer. 6
C. Compensation and Enterprise Liability
The policy of compensating injured consumers47 relates only
tangentially to the apportionment problem, for the division of lia-
bility among tortfeasors does not affect the amount awarded to the
victim. Where a tortfeasor is unable to satisfy its share of the judg-
ment, however, the policy of full compensation requires that the
risk of injury, they may be "fully capable of assuming and distributing losses," and it might
therefore be undesirable to shift losses from consumers to manufacturers. Keeton, supra
note 14, at 1334.
44 See Posner, supra note 25, at 210. Some very large companies acquire, on their own
or with other companies, insurance organizations that are known as captive insurers. See 1
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LAB--rrY: PRODUCT LiALU-
rrY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY 1-8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT]. Under recent federal legislation, moreover, groups of product manufacturers and
sellers may pool their risk of product liability, thereby obtaining insurance that they might
otherwise have been unable to afford or obtain. Product Liability Risk Retention Act, Pub.
L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949 (1981) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3901-3904 (West Supp. 1982)).
4" The recent upheavals in product liability rules have rendered liability losses highly
unpredictable, thus accounting for much of the reluctance of insurance companies to insure
certain product lines. See 1 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 44, at ES-5. This problem
would be resolved in the long run by consistent liability standards.
46 Note that both policies might instead call for no judicial intervention, if the opera-
tion of the Coase theorem would impose liability on the appropriate manufacturer at a lower
cost. See supra note 22.
', See MUPLA, supra note 9, § 103(c)(1), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,720. Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363,
376 (1965). But see Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. REv. 643, 644-45 (1978).
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other tortfeasors make up the difference.48
Enterprise liability-the policy of imposing the social costs of
an enterprise on those who benefit directly from it4 --also is unaf-
fected by methods of allocating liability between partmakers and
assemblers.50 Where a finished product can be manufactured in a
single stage, its producers will pass a portion of their accident lia-
bility on to the product's consumers; the exact amount passed on
depends upon the relative elasticities of supply and demand for
the product.5 1 In situations where multiple producers combine to
manufacture a finished product, the method of apportioning liabil-
ity among producers may affect the proportion of liability costs
that can be passed on to the product's consumers.5 2 Whether liabil-
"' See MUPLA, supra note 9, § 111(B)(6), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,735; W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 100, at 662-65 (4th ed. 1971).
" See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1965);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 440, 191 N.E.2d 81, 85, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (1963) (Burke, J., dissenting); James, General Products-Should Manu-
facturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923, 926-27 (1957).
In a sense, both enterprise liability and risk spreading may be viewed simply as two
stages in the process by which an activity's social costs are imposed on its beneficiaries. As
Professor Calabresi has noted, most definitions of enterprise liability refer to some form of
risk spreading. G. CALABREsi, supra note 15, at 50-54. Calabresi has characterized one func-
tion of enterprise liability as achieving an optimal allocation of resources. By causing a
product's accident costs to be reflected in its price, consumers can determine more accu-
rately whether its benefits outweigh its costs. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distri-
bution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500-03 (1961). Viewed in this way, risk
spreading is an incidental consequence of enterprise liability. Id. at 501. The goal of risk
spreading in minimizing individual economic dislocations carries independent force, how-
ever. See Feezer, supra note 42, at 809. For this reason, the two policies are treated sepa-
rately in this comment.
5o As used in this context, "enterprise liability" should not be confused with those doc-
trines that visit the sins of one manufacturer upon an entire industry. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (once duty of care estab-
lished, each member of blasting cap industry had burden of proving its products did not
cause the accident); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980) (liability for all DES industry members with a substantial portion of the market, in
proportion to their relative market shares), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979) (all known manufacturers of DES
whose products were distributed in Michigan at the relevant time held jointly and severally
liable for personal injuries suffered by plaintiffs). In this comment, "enterprise" refers solely
to the manufacturer or manufacturers proven to have produced the defective product that
caused the injury.
51 See Calabresi, supra note 49, at 519-27. In a competitive environment, a producer
whose products have a defect that is not common to its competitor's products will be unable
to pass any liability on to consumers and will be forced to bear all liability that results from
accidents caused by the defect. If such a producer attempted to pass on a portion of its
liability costs through higher prices charged to consumers, they would quickly begin
purchasing a competitor's products instead.
52 As long as transaction costs are not prohibitive, multiple producers will bargain
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ity is fastened on one producer or apportioned among them, how-
ever, the goals of enterprise liability will not be undermined: the
product's accident costs will continue to be distributed only among
its manufacturers and consumers.
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The cheapest cost avoider analysis developed in part I illus-
trates the inherent flaws of comparative apportionment between
component manufacturers and assemblers in strict liability cases.
In City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc.,53 for exam-
ple, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied a chassis assembler and
a chassis dealer indemnity against a wheel manufacturer for a de-
fective wheel that caused a city fire truck to overturn. Although
the manufacturer "had exclusive control of the design, material,
selection, chemistry, and workmanship of the wheel,"" and al-
though there was no way to inspect the wheel for the defect "ex-
cept by removing a core sample which would render [it]
unusable, ' 5 the court remanded the case so that the jury could
assess percentages of comparative liability among the manufac-
turer, assembler, and dealer.56 The court all but stated that the
manufacturer had the lowest costs of detection and control, yet it
sent the case back for a hopelessly arbitrary liability allocation.
Granting full indemnity against the manufacturer would have best
served the policies of strict liability.
57
among themselves to impose their liability burden on the cheapest cost avoider, thereby
incurring transaction costs. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. Supply elasticity
will therefore increase in response to economies of scale (and decrease in response to dis-
economies of scale) in such Coase theorem transactions.
Where an individual manufacturer makes products with defects not common to its com-
petitor's products, it will be unable to shift liability costs forward or back onto other pro-
ducers or suppleis. For example, if partmaker A is held liable, assemblers like B will refuse
to compensate him for his increased costs, for they can acquire components elsewhere at the
original market price. If liability for a defective component is instead imposed on B, he will
quickly discover that his marginal costs can be reduced by converting to nondefective com-
ponents. Similar forces will prevent a defective assembler from shifting its liability burden
back onto its component suppliers.
58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
-Id. at 645, 207 N.W.2d at 867.
Id., 207 N.W.2d at 868.
58 Id. at 654-55, 207 N.W.2d at 872-73. The lower court had granted indemnity to the
chassis dealer against the assembler, but had denied indemnity to the assembler against the
manufacturer. The supreme court reversed both decisions.
11 Although this comment focuses solely on apportionment between partmakers and
assemblers, the cheapest cost avoider analysis can also be applied to distributors, dealers,
and retailers to govern their relative liabilities. For example, Alabama provides a complete
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The outcomes of other cases, however, seem consistent with
cheapest cost avoider analysis. Burbage v. Boiler Engineering and
Supply Co.58 is illustrative. In that case, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court granted full indemnity to the assembler against the
manufacturer of a defective boiler valve, stating that "there is no
reason why [the assembler] should have discovered the defect. '5 9
Put into cheapest cost avoider terms, the court's reasoning indi-
cates that the assembler faced higher detection costs than the
partmaker. If, as appears likely, the assembler also faced higher
control costs, then granting full indemnity against the valve manu-
facturer was the proper outcome. 0
Intuitive renditions of the cheapest cost avoider test are fre-
quently used in cases where the defect arose from the absence of a
safety device. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,61 for example, which
nicely illustrates the duty-to-warn paradigm, involved an assem-
bler who had installed the partmaker's heating units into a com-
plete boiler system without including necessary mixing valves. Ab-
solving the partmaker of liability for the resulting injuries, the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that it would have been imprac-
tical for the partmaker to install mixing valves at its stage of pro-
duction,6" that the assembler had "deliberately disregarded" a
strong recommendation by the partmaker to use mixing valves,63
and that the assembler was "highly responsible," with "extensive
experience in the field."'" The court concluded that because the
partmaker could not compel the assembler to purchase and install
mixing valves, "no just purpose would be served by affixing respon-
"causal relation" defense against strict liability for distributors and packagers of finished
products if they can show that the product was received in the defective condition, that they
did not contribute to that condition, that they were unaware of it, and that they had no
opportunity to inspect the product. See Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134,
143 (Ala. 1976). Satisfaction of these four requirements proves that the distributor or pack-
ager had higher detection and control costs than the manufacturer. Unfortunately, the
causal relation defense is unavailable to product manufacturers where the defect is in a
component made by a third party. Id.
433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969).
59 Id. at 326, 249 A.2d at 567. The boiler valve had an indentation on its face that
caused the boiler to explode. The factfinder determined that the valve was in this condition
when it left the component manufacturer. Id. at 325, 249 A.2d at 566.
6o See also Herman v. General Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472, 478 (N.D. 1976) (holding
manufacturer of defective engine liable in indemnity to the assembler-seller of irrigation
system).
61 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
62 Id. at 98, 207 A.2d at 330.
Id. at 97, 207 A.2d at 329.
Id. at 98, 207 A.2d at 329.
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sibility to it in addition to [the assembler]."" Put in cheapest cost
avoider terms, the partmaker's warning shifted liability to the as-
sembler, who had lower control costs.66
Similar inquiries are sometimes made where the assembler is
also the ultimate consumer of the final product. In Shawver v.
Roberts Corp.,6 7 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ab-
solved the partmaker of liability where the assembler-consumer in-
cluded the partmaker's components in a conveyor belt assembly
without adequate safety devices in the electrical control system. It
was "not feasible or practical" for the partmaker to include safety
devices at its stage of production, because such devices had to be
"integrated with a control system and the general work environ-
ment." 8 Moreover, the partmaker had no duty to warn the assem-
bler, because the latter had its own engineering department that
routinely evaluated and incorporated safety devices in products it
assembled.69 Put another way, the assembler certainly had lower
control costs and probably lower detection costs as well.70
Id. at 99, 207 A.2d at 330.
See also Willeford v. Mayrath, 7 Ill. App. 3d 357, 361, 287 N.E.2d 502, 505 (1972)
(partmaker not liable for assembler's failure to install a safety shield in an elevator where
assembler "knew of the importance of attaching the shield" and the partmaker had "no
control" over the assembly process); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 122
(Miss. 1966) (partmaker not liable for installer's failure to include a safety valve where
partmaker explicitly instructed installer on the installation of the valve and where the valve
was "customarily" and "more conveniently" installed by the installer), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 912 (1967). But see DeSantis v. Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1976)
(partmaker held fully liable for assembler's failure to install safety guard where guard could
have been attached when product was in partmaker's hands).
'7 90 Wis. 2d 672, 280 N.W.2d 226 (1979).
a Id. at 685-86, 280 N.W.2d at 233. The court found that the defect arose from the
nature and location of the controls and that the partmaker had shipped the conveyor sys-
tem unassembled and without controls.
"Id. at 686, 280 N.W.2d at 233.
70 See also Taylor v. Paul 0. Abbe, Inc., 516 F.2d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying
Pennsylvania law) (gear manufacturer absolved of liability for injury to assembler's em-
ployee where assembler failed to include safety guard after refusing manufacturer's offer to
sell such a guard). The court in Taylor drew a fine line between a partmaker that sells an
incomplete product for final assembly by the purchaser and the manufacturer that sells a
complete product lacking a safety device. Id. at 148-49. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 410, 290 A.2d 281, 285 (1972) (product is defective if manufacturer could
feasibly include the safety device, even though manufacturer could have foreseen that the
purchaser would not install it); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d
267 (1977) (partmaker not liable where assembler modified punch press so as to render the
press unsafe without a safety guard). In Temple, the court held that the duty to warn "does
not extend to the speculative anticipation of how manufactured components, not in and of
themselves dangerous or defective, can become potentially dangerous dependent upon the
nature of their integration into a unit designed and assembled by another." Id. at 324, 364
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Detection issues sometimes arise where a partmaker manufac-
tures components according to an assembler's specifications. In
Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 1 a conveyor that lacked safety devices
when it left the patmaker's hands caused injury to the assembler's
employee. The conveyor, however, was designed by the assembler
as part of an overall plant design, and the assembler refused to
show the partmaker the plant design or give it access to the
plant.7 2 The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
summary judgment for the partmaker, reasoning that the
partmaker could not be expected to add safety devices without a
knowledge of the environment in which the conveyor would be
used.73  In other words, the assembler's secrecy made the
partmaker's detection costs prohibitive.
In Verge v. Ford Motor Co.,74 the Third Circuit went beyond
intuitive use of the cheapest cost avoider test. The defect involved
was the lack of a warning buzzer on a garbage truck, which would
sound when the truck was put in reverse. The partmaker manufac-
tured the truck's cab and chassis, and the assembler converted the
chassis into a garbage truck. The court held that liability as be-
tween the two should be decided by trade custom, relative exper-
tise, and practicality. 5 The court could not examine trade custom
for lack of evidence, 7 but held that the evidence on the other two
factors suggested that the assembler should be fully liable. It was
not "feasible" for the partmaker to determine which units would
be converted into garbage trucks and would therefore require
warning buzzers,7 and the assembler had greater expertise in and
total control over the process of assembling garbage trucks.7 8
Viewed in light of the cheapest cost avoider test, trade custom
might have provided evidence of relative costs by showing how the
N.E.2d at 272. The assembler, moreover, had known for years that using such guards would
prevent the accident in question, so that it would be "[m]anifestly ... futile to require that
[the partmaker] notify [the plaintiff] of that which the responsible party [the assembler]
... was already aware." Id. at 325, 364 N.E.2d at 272. Even though the court did not ex-
plicitly say so, it effectively held that a partmaker has no duty to warn an assembler of a
danger when the assembler has lower control costs and lower or equal costs of detecting the
danger.
71 205 Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430 (1980).
72 Id. at 300, 287 N.W.2d at 434.
73 Id. at 299-300, 287 N.W.2d at 434.
74 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978).
75 Id. at 387.
76 Id. at 387-88.
7 Id. at 387, 389.
78 Id. at 388.
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market has allocated the duty to install safety devices." The
partmaker did not have the lowest detection costs, for only the as-
sembler could practically determine which units would become
garbage trucks. Expertise accounts for both detection and control
costs, for the assembler chose the units for conversion and had ex-
clusive control over the conversion process.
Verge and its progeny 0 reflect a welcome trend in tort law,
indicating that courts are striving to formulate workable criteria to
impose appropriate incentives on potential tortfeasors. Much con-
fusion can be avoided if in each case courts ask, first which party is
better able to learn of the potentially hazardous condition, and
second, which is better able to control the production process to
prevent such hazards from materializing.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the major policies behind strict products liability
demonstrates that objective standards must guide the apportion-
ment of liability between partmakers and assemblers; schemes of
comparative apportionment yield satisfactory results only through
pure chance. Where judicial intervention is necessary, courts
should structure liability to create incentives for parties to prevent
defects at the least cost. This comment has argued that this goal is
best achieved by determining the parties' relative costs of detec-
tion and control. In the alternative-care case, full liability should
be placed on the cheapest cost avoider. In the joint-care case, a
duty to warn should be imposed on the cheapest detector, satisfac-
tion of which would shift full liability to the cheapest controller.
Consistent, reasoned application of this approach will most effec-
tively achieve the goals underlying strict liability.
Richard D. Cunningham
79 The court's decision to proceed with a resolution despite the absence of evidence of
trade custom, id. at 387-88, implies that it viewed this element as relatively unimportant. In
any event, trade custom should be rebuttable by more direct evidence of relative costs.
8o See Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407,413 (N.D. Okla. 1979)
(component manufacturer not responsible for "the ultimate design and construction of...
the safety devices"); Mott v. Callahan AMS Mach. Co., 174 N.J. Super. 202, 210, 416 A.2d
57, 61 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (remanding for plenary trial to apply the three-pronged
Verge test). See also Elliott v. Century Chevrolet Co., 597 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)
(manufacturer and original seller of beer truck chassis absolved of liability in a negligence
action on facts almost identical to those in Verge).
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